Workshop-seminar, 23-25 May, 2005, MEKARN-CTU |
Contents |
Availability of primary resources and environmental, ecological,
social and political issues are having, or will have, enormous
effects on rural development in the near future. There is evidence
that world oil production is close to or has peaked. Agriculture
will be massively handicapped by expensive energy in the future.
The global peak in production of high-quality fossil fuels is
already causing concern throughout the world's economy. Barely
recognized by politicians, scientists or the public, this event
will precipitate a cascade of environmental, economic, political
and cultural changes for which society is totally unprepared. These
changes will be seen as threats and global energy peak has the
potential to quickly eclipse climate change as the driving force
for sustainable development. Economic growth depends heavily on
increasing availability of oil for transportation, agriculture and
industry and for more then half a million manufactured
products
Industrial agriculture and intensive systems of animal
production have evolved in an era of low cost fuel and subsidized
production that maintained relatively inexpensive food commodities.
This era appears to be about to end as fuel and other costs of crop
production are built into the sale price of products. Land use will
change with strong emphasis placed on crops for alcohol, biomass
and bio fuels production, particularly in the industrialized world.
This will intensify competition for grain for food, feed or
feedstock. The use of cereal grains for livestock production will
need to be substantially reduced. This signals a change in the
direction of meat protein production away from industrialized pig
and poultry and feed lot cattle to ruminant animals managed on
forage and byproducts of crop production
The problem appears to be so acute that it will be impossible
for the emerging nations to develop along the same lines as did the
now industrialized world and all countries of the world will
require a "non fossil fuel" dependent development strategy for the
future. The general viewpoint is that future society will be
organized in a very different way to the present time. Priorities
in food production industries will eventually be on smaller, more
localized and decentralized communities with farms involving
multiple crops, animals, birds and fish and away from the
specialized farm that produces only a few products. It appears that
no alternative energy source can substitute for oil and any
potential alternative technology is insufficiently developed or
funded to make a sufficient contribution to the world's energy
needs in time to postpone peak oil.
Planet earth is under a number of interacting stresses brought about by human activity. If humans are to continue to develop [or merely exist] there will be need for a major adjustment of people's activities. Four major stresses can be identified including;
Pollution and climate change with potential abrupt environmental warming
Scarcity of fuel or renewable energy that can be harnessed to replace fossil fuels; Oil production could peak [has peaked] and world supplies will start to decline with massive effects on human activity
Scarcity of water -by 2025, 60% of the world's people are likely to be living with insufficient water. Water for irrigation will limit food production
Loss of biodiversity with extinction of large numbers of organisms
Continuing population increase [mainly in the resource poor countries]
Over the past 20 years global warming has become increasingly
recognised as potentially the greatest threat to the well being of
humans. However, peak oil, barely recognised or stuck in "the too
hard basket" by politicians, scientists and world leaders, is now
[2005] creating shock waves through the world's economy. In the
short term, the outcomes from peak oil may reduce the commitment by
governments to greenhouse gas abatement policies. It appears that
the potentially high cost of energy will, however, be a major
driving force for sustainable development in the future. As every
aspect of living is highly dependent on liquid fuel sources, the
coming oil crisis will impact on all segments of a country's economy and in
particular on agriculture and livestock
farming.
The decline in available fuel and subsequent rise in price will
precipitate a cascade of environmental, economic, political and
cultural changes for which we are totally unprepared.
To date humans have been able to expand their population and
their standard of living by
increasing the available resource base in terms of energy,
water, land and food
minimising and reducing colonisation [i.e. predation]. Although
there is still an enormous inequitable use of resources
particularly oil.
containing pestilence [but present disease pandemics appear to
be out of control (eg: HIV infections, SARS and Avian flu]
controlling localised pollution [but have not yet polluted
the atmosphere with gases to the extent where life becomes
unlivable]
Limits to human population growth have been proposed over the
years but human ingenuity has overcome these limitations as they
have arisen. The standard of living has also increased, but
disproportionately both within and between countries. But can all
this continue?
In terms of future development, the availability of fossil energy resources is a major factor. Those countries and governments that had early access to these inexpensive energy resources were able to develop their economies rapidly. The availability of cheap energy has allowed many of the commodities of life to be produced at low cost. This applied particularly to food production. For example, grain production could be highly mechanised with fewer people needed in this area of food production, but at a high cost in the use of fossil fuel [see Table 1].With the advent of high yielding cereal varieties, world grain production increased four fold but only with massive increases in the use of fossil fuels and electricity. The improved yields were largely a result of direct and indirect inputs of oil in machinery and production and transport of fertilisers and other inputs. The energy use efficiency was. however, markedly reduced in modern agriculture as compared with traditional systems [Table 1; Figure 1].
Table 1: Modern, mechanised agriculture has increased grain yields as compared to traditional agriculture dependent on human and animal traction. |
||
|
Non mechanised agriculture
[
Developing countries, |
Mechanised agriculture
[Industrialised countries, |
Energy inputs [MJ /ha] |
2,318 |
35,132 |
Grain yield [MJ /ha] |
28,895 |
60,025 |
Grain yield [kg/ha] |
1,944 |
7000 |
Energy ratio [energy in grain to energy input] |
12.5:1 |
2.9:1 |
Figure 1: The energy inputs per unit of grain production in some
selected industrial countries
compared with developing nations
[Pretty 1995]
The link between inexpensive fuel and inexpensive food is undeniable. For example the more developed the country, the greater the fossil fuel input into cereal grain production [Figure 1], increasing yields but at greater cost of fuel per unit of production [Table 1]. Efficient manufacturing took people away from agriculture. The resultant wealth was partially used to subsidise food production [kept grain prices low] which in turn allowed the intensification of animal production. It is also follows that agriculture in industrialised countries requires far fewer people compared with small farm operations in developing countries (Table 2).
Table 2: Energy use by developed and developing countries in relation to the numbers of people working in agriculture [Pimentel et al 1988] |
|||
|
Total |
Per capita |
% population in agriculture |
US |
18400 |
77 |
2.6 |
Brazil |
600 |
4 |
37 |
India |
900 |
1 |
62 |
Kenya |
12 |
0.6 |
75 |
Global energy peak and subsequent high oil prices provide the potential for political neglect of environmental aspects [eg: increased use of coal for electricity generation as against use of more expensive renewable energy]. It is likely to increase conflict between oil-rich and oil-poor countries[predation as a grab for fuel] and could trivialize the prevention of pestilence [eg: AIDS] and increase the poverty status particularly of the poor in developing countries, who have very low incomes and are unable to take advantage even of cheap oil [eg: the need for cooking fuel may increase the rate of deforestation in countries such as Nigeria]. Countries with emerging economies will need to draw on cheap labor to lower the effects of expensive fuel in order to continue their economic growth
The world is not running out of oil. The world is running out of
inexpensive oil. Cheap oil fuelled the economic development
[miracle?] of the industrialised nations in the 20th
century. This applies, in particular to the USA that has
appropriated oil at a faster rate then any other nation and is now
the wealthiest country in the world. It also has the highest
conversion of oil into food in the world.
Because the USA produces 5% of the world's oil but
consumes around 30%, the USA will need to reduce oil use at least by 5% per year
if there is to be any possibility of the developing countries securing an
equitable proportion of the remaining oil. On average most of the developing
countries are self-sufficient in food production but the margins of production
are finely balanced. World surplus grain has been traditionally available when
calamities result in potential famines. North America [USA and Canada] is the
major food exporter and this has immense implications for
the rest of the world. As liquid fuel supply relative to demand
decreases, industrialised countries and many others will reduce
their inputs into food production and increase their inputs into
feedstock production for industry, particularly for fuel alcohol
and biodiesel production
Fossil fuel reserves were deposited from the residues of algae
growing in warm shallow seas followed by burial as the sea floor
sank and the debris was heated by the earth's heat flow over
hundreds of thousands of years. Oil deposits occur in only a
few of the potentially oil-bearing geological provinces. Most of
these areas have been mapped and there is good information on the
likely total world reserves before exploitation and to the present
time [Fleay 1996].
World total oil resources [other then the hard -to-get oils in
deep sea areas, or locked up in tar sands], are estimated to be
close to 2000 billion barrels. These calculations are based
on already extracted oil plus the estimated reserves in known
fields and a prediction of the yet to be discovered fields. The
"to-be-found" oil will be in the most difficult sites to mine [eg: polar and deep sea oil] and therefore this oil is recognised as
a high-priced resource [ASOP 2002].
There are potentially 3000 billion barrels of oil in the tar
sands and shale oil deposits, largely in US and Canada [Johnson et
al 2004]. Exploitation of this non-conventional oil is difficult
and also hazardous as it requires considerable amounts of water,
is energy-expensive to extract and highly polluting. It appears to
require about 2 barrels of conventional oil to effectively extract
three barrels of oil from shale deposits [Younquisit 1997]. These reserves will
certainly be mined in the future but with a long lead time. Optimistic estimates
suggest that maybe shale oil will be a "2 million barrel per day industry" in the USA by 2020 [Johnson et
al 2004]. This is less than 2% of the projected world requirement
for oil, but 10% of US present consumption
Following discovery of oil and establishment of facilities, the
rate of extraction of oil increases until a peak in production
of the field is attained and then the extraction rate falls [this
is known as the Hubbert Peak and is bell-shaped]. The peak
extraction rate is always close to the mid point of depletion and
has become known as Peak Oil [ Hubbert 1949]. In the US the discovery rate of oil peaked in 1930. From this
and the depletion curves for oil wells, Dr M King Hubbert predicted
that oil production in the US, would peak in 1970 and decline
thereafter [Hubbert 1956]. At that time, this concept was
universally ridiculed but US [lower 48 states] oil production
peaked and began to fall in 1971-72 { see Campbell and Leherrere
1998]
The reality of the Hubbert Peak concept appears to be now accepted by the petroleum industry and is being used by resource scientists/economists to predict world oil reserves and their likely depletion rates. This is discussed in the books by Fleay [1995], Campbell [1997], Youngquist [1997], Deffeyes [2001] and Roberts [2004]. Oil discoveries world-wide, peaked in the mid 1960s and have declined since and the total world production of oil [Peak Oil] has been estimated to occur in 3 to10 years [Figure 2].
Figure 2: Current forecast of future world oil production, including non-conventional oil [ASPO 2002]
The world has been using oil at a greater rate than the discovery rate [Figure 3]; for every new barrel discovered the world is currently using 4-6 barrels. In the last two years the discovery rate for new oil has only been around 10-20 billion barrels despite highly sophisticated and accurate methodology for identifying the geological formations where oil and gas would have accumulated. Oil field discoveries with more then 500 million barrels of oil were numerous a few years ago but no discoveries of this size have been made since 2002 [there were two in 2002, 6 in 2001 and 13 in 2000]. It is widely publicised that the net present value of all discoveries for the 5 major oil groups during the 3 years 2001-3 is less then their exploration costs. [Duffin 2004, see Ruppert 2005].
Figure 3. The difference in the rate of discovery of oil and the rate of oil use in the world [Campbell 2001].
As Ruppert [2004] recently stated; "The subject of Peak
Oil requires a little study to get your brain around it. However,
it does not need much science except basic arithmetic".
The statistics of oil production and use are as
follows:
Oil use in the world has increased to around 80-82 million
barrels/day or 1 billion barrels are used every 12 days. Demand will
rise conservatively to 90-100 million barrels/day by 2010
[McKillop 2004a]
All the major oil fields were discovered long ago and most have exceeded Peak Production and are in decline. According to Magoon [2001] a prominent US oil geologist, North America [including Alaskan and Mexican fields] peaked in 1984, the former Soviet Union in 1987, Europe in 2001, Africa in 2001, Asia Pacific 2003, South and Central America 2005 and the Middle East ....[?? 2010].
The discovery of large oil fields has dwindled
to zero, small finds are occurring but not at a sufficient rate
and global oil production capacity is contracting by over 1 million
barrels each day every year.
Peak oil production [including new oil finds] is predicted to be
90-92 million
The spare capacity for pumping oil, largely in the Middle East
and Russia at the present time, is approximately 2-3 million
barrels daily and in the light of numerous factors that can
interfere with supply [war, terrorism acts including sabotage of oil
supply lines, clogged shipping routes, high freight charges, lack
of refinery facilities and tankers and political action] the
potential is unlikely to be delivered
Demand for oil, particularly by China, India, Pakistan and
some Latin American countries, is increasing at unprecedented
rates. Global demand is expected to increase by at least 1 million
barrels every day each year
It appears therefore inevitable that fuel will be scarce and
expensive in years to come.
There is great concern among investment bankers that lack of
transparency in reporting oil reserves in some countries, may hide
an imminent and cataclysmic fall in world oil reserves [see Simmons
2002; Schempf 2004; Ruppert 2004; Roberts 2004]. The problem can be summarised as follows;
The Middle East has 75% of the world's remaining
oil.
Ghawar [Saudi Arabia] had 100 billion barrels of reserves [only
1 field of this size has ever been discovered] and dominates
Saudi's capacity to produce oil.
Ghawar has been mined, from its beginning [1948], to maintain
high flow rates by pumping in sea water to lift the oil and it is
50 years since it started to be tapped at a significant
rate
Ghawar is now pumping a mix of 55 % water and 45 %
oil
Experience shows that when the water content of the liquid at
the oil well head exceeds 70-80%, a field collapses much more
rapidly than indicated by the Hubbert model. Ismail [1993], from an
in-depth study of the capacity expansion of Gulf field, claimed that Ghawar was in decline even then, supporting the belief that
Ghawar's reserves have been over estimated and the wells could
soon enter a serious decline
The major conclusion is that if this mega field of Saudi Arabia
has peaked, the date for World Peak Oil may have already
occurred.
McKillop [2004b] summarises the world oil situation
by stating that,
"world oil demand increase in the coming years [to
2010]will not be less then 1.75 million barrels /day, barring world
wide economic recession through use of interest rate weapons as a
response to runaway oil prices. The only potential for a real fall
in oil demand is through intense economic recession triggered by
massive rises in interest rates in the OECD countries"
There are few written and objective dissensions from this view point in the oil literature and for the first time it appears that the US Department of Energy is acknowledging the imminence of Peak Oil [see Johnson et al 2004]. The arguments appear convincing that there is a fast emerging world oil shortfall. This together with an increasing dependence on Russian and Saudi Arabia, to meet the extra demand, is predicted to result in inflated oil prices. The lack of available technology to replace fluid fuel will necessitate a transition to lower energy use generally, stimulation of greater energy efficiency and conservation, rapid development of renewable fuel technology and restructuring of society. Agriculture in general, and food production and distribution in particular, will be considerably handicapped and will require a total rethink, particularly industrial agriculture which will have to move gradually towards more sustainable practices.
The world price of oil is predicted to rise because of a number
of factors including the decline in oil production, the increasing
monopoly of the oil markets, and increasing demand for oil as countries
develop and populations grow. High yields of grain depend heavily
on fossil fuel inputs [see Table1] and in the future, the competition for
grain for food, feed and feedstock should see a steep rise in the
price of grain.
Oil economics are dominated by what happens in the USA,
whose economy is built around an extensive transport system primarily fuelled by
petroleum. Industrial agriculture is dependent on petroleum to
power machinery and pumps for irrigation and to manufacture fertilisers and herbicides on which high yields of crops are
dependent. The USA has the highest per capita consumption of
gasoline and an extremely high use of gasoline per unit of food
production. It also produces the highest proportion of the world's
traded food and being the world's largest importer of oil it has to
carefully manage fuel supplies. Thus the USA is diversifying both
internal energy supplies [coal, shale oil and bio-fuels] and also
sourcing its supply from a diverse number of countries in order to
guarantee supply. All developed nations in fact are
positioning themselves similarly to the USA.
The tragedy that is unfolding is that some of the
oil and gas for the industrialized countries is sourced from developing
countries that have a real or perceived need for capital, from oil
sales, to fuel economic growth [often manufacturing]. At this point
in time, these countries are depleting, or have depleted, their own
oil reserves that will be needed for development; particularly to
finance food production in the future and they will ultimately need
to buy fuel and food on world markets at inflated costs. The
populations of the developing countries are still increasing
despite enormous annual death rates largely in Africa from hunger
[10-15 million people] and disease [AIDS; 3 million; diarrhea, 1.8
million; TB,1.6 million; malaria,1.3 million; measles;1 million]
[United Nations, Millennium Indicators Database 2004]. The end of
oil signals an increased problem for nations and organisations
dealing with these symptoms of poverty.
Any change in resource use in the USA has major
implications for the rest of the world. The US accounts for 31% of global income
and the next four gross national incomes [Japan, Germany, the UK, and France]
together with the US account for 60%. The conclusion from this is that what happens to fuel supply, demand and use in the USA
and its flow-on to the cost of food production, will have major
effects on the rate and pattern of production and consumption in
the rest of the world, particularly that of the developing
countries. The dependency of the USA on external sources of oil
means that its foreign policies are influenced at all times by oil
politics. It also means that oil security may take precedence over
food supply that is surplus to US needs, especially those foods
that are exported.
The USS uses close to 20 million barrels of oil per day and as discussed later the ultimate world peak production of all liquid fuels is estimated to be close to 90 million barrels per day. There are some 200 million vehicles in the USA, about a third of the total in the world [630 million]. Ivanhoe [1998] put the situation of the dependency of people in the US succinctly, when he pointed out the dependency of urban dwellers on the two-week turn over of food and fuel in the major cities. The US consumption of petroleum products in 1998 [Table 3] emphasises that transportation has the greatest demand which is closely associated with the extent of urbanisation.
Table 3: Oil resources use in the USAas an example of the pattern in most developed countries [Data source, Ivanhoe 1998] |
|
Sector |
Million barrels per day |
Transportation |
11.68 |
Industrial Feed Stock |
4.61 |
Residential and Commercial |
1.13 |
Electric Utilities |
0.29 |
TOTAL |
17.70 |
Figure 4: Global tendencies in production of alcohol
(Berg 2003]
The energy balance of maize or sugar cane to alcohol does not take into account the costs of:
transporting alcohol from distant fields to the major cities with air pollution problems [quantities produced are too low to establish pipe lines];
the building of infrastructure to store alcohol ;
soil erosion, particularly in grain production;
the depletion of resources such as water;
the down stream effects of pollution caused by run-off of nutrients from farms [For example, no costs are directed at US grain producers for the 21,000 square mile "Dead Zone" in the Gulf of Mexico due to eutrophication, attributable, to a considerable extent, to fertilizer run-off via the Mississippi basin from grain lands];
the loss of land mass in the same area attributable to both subsidence from oil removal, the low flows of water and sediment in the Mississippi river, due to the huge off-take of water for irrigation.
Alcohol production will undoubtedly provide alternative markets for grain and much of the 'set-aside land' in industrialized countries will be used for this purpose. It is estimated that 12% of the maize production in the United States will be diverted from animal and human food/feed to alcohol production. This will surely "dry up" world surplus grain and challenge the world's chances of avoiding mass starvation if food shortages occur in the developing nations particularly in Africa. Many countries are now actively encouraging the development of fuel ethanol industries [see Berg 2001].
Figure 5: Past and future trends for conversion of maize to alcohol in USA [Pearse Lyons and Bannerman 2001]
It appears inevitable that grain prices will increase throughout the world. Inexpensive grain will become scarce in a world where large numbers of resource-poor people already suffer under-nutrition and mal-nutrition. At the same time as the competition for grain for food feed or feedstock intensifies it is likely that many of the inputs to grain farming will increase in price in line with fuel prices .Inevitably North American and European subsidies on grain production [which are as high as 28% of the cost of production] will be removed. The higher costs of inputs, lowered subsidies and competition for end use, together with the potential for the environmental costs to be added to the cost of grain production will ensure that the world price will be high and availability for feeding animals will be reduced.
If grain is to meet the proposed increase in industrialised pig and poultry industries foreseen in the Livestock Revolution [Delgado et al 1999] then this will need to compete with the ever increasing demand for feedstock for alcohol. Much of the set aside land in Europe and America may have to be brought back into production to meet the feedstock requirements; but in the developing countries there is no such land available other then the dangerous option of moving into marginal lands and clearing rain forests.
In 2000 in the European Union, 3.9 million
hectares of agricultural land were set-aside on which feedstock for alcohol and
bio fuel could be grown. These land areas could produce 1.2-5% of
total transport fuel consumption [Gunter Hanrerich 2002 see FO
Lights 2002]. This demonstrates the small role set aside land will
play when oil becomes scarce and prices rise. Bio-fuels such as oil from vegetable oil seeds, coconuts or oil
palm can have only limited application to transport energy because
of the size of the requirements and also because they are also
produced with inputs of fossil fuels and the land use for oil crops
will compete with land use for food crops. Despite the obvious problems it is apparent that many countries
and especially the US are pursuing the alcohol option and there is
mounting interest in bio-fuels all over the world. On small farms
in developing countries there are options to use producer gas
generated from crop by-products [Preston and Leng 2004].
Estimates in the US are that by 2010 some 50 million tonnes of grain will be converted to alcohol [Figure 5]. This is close to the present exportable grain surplus (about 60 million tonnes) from that country.
Figure 6: World production and demand for maize [Rameker 2004]
The related problem is that, as is the case with oil, world demand exceeds the supply (Figure 6), with the result that world stocks have steadily declined over the past few years [Figure 7] and production per capita is in decline [see Figure 8].
Figure 7: Trends in world stocks of maize [Rameker 2004]
Figure 8: The decreasing world per capita grain availability [Brown 1999
The same trend is seen for China, the country whose high rate of
economic growth is fueling the demand for grain as well as for oil.
But demand over the past 4 years has increasingly exceeded
production with the result that the shortfall has had to be made up
from the reserve stocks. In 2005, it is expected that China will be
a net importer of maize (Rameker 2004). Current world stocks are
the lowest for 30 years [Brown 2004]. Thus the future for feed
grains, [the picture for soy beans is similar (Rameker 2004)], is
likely to mirror that for oil, with a steadily increasing gap
between supply and demand, and therefore increasing prices. The
repercussions on the intensive animal feed industries are likely to
be dramatic and contrary to the optimistic predictions of the
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC
(Delgado et al 1999)
As the energy crisis evolves it is likely that specialised
agricultural systems providing single commodities to extensive
markets will be gradually displaced by mixed and integrated crop
and animal farming guided by modern "permaculture" principles and
targeted for local consumption. Many rural communities in the
industrialised world will need to be reinforced at the expense of
suburban development, as their roles in local food production
increase. The shift from industrialised farming to sustainable
agriculture in Cuba, following the loss of cheap oil from the
former Soviet Union in 1989, may be an example of the strategy that
will evolve in the developed countries [see Funes et al 2002]. In
the developing countries, small integrated farming systems appear
to offer the greatest scope to maintain food production [Preston and Leng 2004]. Ruminant production from dispersed production systems in rural
settings based on roughage and agro-industrial by-products appears
to hold a major hope for meeting the demand for large quantities of
medium to high quality protein for human consumption at affordable
prices [Leng 2002; 2004].
A strategy that produces grain and protein crops at the expense
of both the non replaceable resources [soil and water] and the
endowment of non-renewable resources [fossil fuels] will be at
immense cost to future world populations. However, in the short
term it is inevitable that food will increase in price and the use
of grain for animal production is counter indicated.
It is imperative that, world wide, the decline
in oil, water and soil fertility be slowed and where possible stopped. At the
same time global warming must also be reduced. It appears that
an agriculture that emphasises the use of industrial animal
production systems cannot be sustained in the future and that
alternative sources of protein foods or meat/milk must be
developed. Poultry and pigs can be produced without grain-based
feeds but the ruminant animal has the greatest potential for
sustaining meat and milk production.
Herbivorous animals do not [or should not] compete for resources
with humans but for a range of reasons, major meat-industries
based on grain are established in every country in the world and
presently more than a third of the world's grain production is
destined for feeding to animals. The ruminant, in general, produces
at low efficiencies relative to monogastric animals on grain. Nevertheless, finishing cattle in grain-based feed lots dominates
ruminant meat production in industrialised countries. A recent
article in National Geographic estimated that each 1 kg of live
weight gain of feedlot cattle required the burning of approximately
5.7 litres of oil, when all costs were taken into consideration
[National Geographic 2004]
A large amount of research has demonstrated that considerable
improvement in production can be achieved in the forage-fed
ruminant through applying known scientific principles. It is
possible to use poor quality roughages and agro industrial
by-products as feed and achieve highly efficient production [see
Leng 1990, 2004]
With 1.34 billion cattle and buffalo and 1.68 billion small
ruminants [sheep and goats] already on the planet, the animal
resources to produce the meat and milk needed for future
generations are already available. If the annual meat off-takes
were 100 kg per head per cow and 10kg/ head for small ruminants the
world production of meat would be 151 billion kg or 25 kg/head of
population per year from this resource alone. The fallacies in such
calculations are recognised and the figures are quoted here only
because they indicate the huge potential of ruminants to provide
meat/protein for humans. Except for minor production from a number
of other herbivores [horse, sheep, goats, llama, yaks, camels and rabbits]
cattle already supply the majority of the world's milk and there
are no likely contenders for this role from monogastric animals.
The issue of whether to promote industrial pig and poultry
development or to rely on ruminants for future animal protein is
critical to huge areas of resource use in the world and commitment
to the wrong animal species may have devastating effects on resource
availability for the poorest of nations as the decline in oil
starts to take its effects.
The population in the developed world is predicted to grow older and decrease in numbers whereas another 3 billion people are likely to be born into the developing countries in the next 20 years and their health and well being is at stake in the short term when food production is compromised by the flow on from peak oil.
It is appropriate to finish with a number of quotes from
distinguished petroleum scientists.
C J Campbell [2001] in discussing the decline in oil wrote:
"All this is incredibly obvious [the decline in oil
and its effects on the price of world oil]. The inexplicable part
is our great reluctance to look reality in the face and at least
make some plans for what promises to be one of the greatest
economic and political discontinuities of all time" [Campbell
2001].
W Youngquisit [1997] in discussing future share of resources in
the world wrote:
" If China used oil on a per capita basis at the same
rate as the United States, the Chinese alone would use
approximately 81 million barrels of oil a day, which is 10 million
barrels more than the entire present world oil production . The
pleasant 'Petroleum Interval' will also bypass most of the more
then three quarters of a billion people [now 1 billion] in India,
as well as many people in Africa and South America. These
"oil-less" people will only get a passing distant glimpse of the
benefits which oil bestows on the fortunate people who have
substantial access to it and it could be added, people who use it
with conspicuous lack of restraint.]
Peak oil, is a turning point for mankind as the 100 years of
growth ends [growth in GDP and growth in energy use are highly
related]. Populations in developing countries will also peak as
resources limit the generation of food and facilities. The period
during the decline in oil will be a period of high tension with great
potential for dominance by those industrial nations with the most
to lose [see Ruppert 2004]. Priorities must shift from conspicuous
resource exploitation to self-sufficiency and sustainability of
food production and the environment.
The greatest issue in the world appear to be how to use oil
efficiently from now on? The first step would be to reduce the
flagrant and conspicuous use of oil in transportation. The second,
to enact policies to remove incentives for urbanisation of rural
people and de-urbanise the cities and make the rural settings more
attractive to bring people back into agriculture as the decline of
oil starts to have its effects. The search must continue for new
renewable energy sources. Harnessing solar energy appears to be the
most logical, but the requirement of the world for liquid fuel is
not easily obtained from solar generated power. Recent developments
of alternative renewable fuels will all contribute to meeting
energy requirements. Harnessing these energy sources seems to be
potentially possible with new technology such as the use of silicon
generated from sand using dispersed energy capture technology [Auer
2004]. However, there remains the problem that just to replace the
oil using vehicles in the UK with vehicles running on hydrogen
alone would require the construction of 100 nuclear plants or
100,000 wind turbines [Oswald and Oswald 2005]. There is no cheap
fix for the energy of the future.
ASPO 2002 Statistical review of world oil and gas.
Association for the study of peak oil 1st Edition
Proceedings 1st International Workshop on Oil Depletion.
Uppsala. Sweden. Editors: Aleklett K and Campbell C. www.isv.uu.se/iwood2002/ASPO-stat-Rev.hlml
ASPO 2004 http://www.peakoil.net/
Auer J 2004
Energy prospects after the petroleum age Deutsche
Bank Research
http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD/PROD0000000000181487.PDF
Berg C 2001
World Ethanol Production FO Licht's
International Molasses and Alcohol Report. http://www.fo-licht.com
Berg C 2003 World bio fuel production. Int. Sugar J, 1 1 5-15
Brown L 2004 In Seminar on Sustainable Consumption and Production. UNEP Monterrey Mexico http://www.uneptie.org/pc/SCP8/first.htm
Campbell C J 2003 The Essence of Oil & Gas Depletion;
Multi-Science, 342p
Campbell C J 1997 The Coming Oil Crisis. Multi -Science
Publishing Company & Petroconsultants. S A Essex England 219
p
Campbell C J 2001 Peak Oil: A Turning Point for Mankind , Hubbert Center Newsletter 2001/2-1-1 April 2001
Campbell C J and Leherrere J H
1998 The End of Cheap Oil. Scientific American
1998 www.dieoff.org/page140.htm
Deffeyes K S 2001
Hubberts Peak ;The Impending world Shortage
of Oil. Princetown University Press .New Jersey. USA
08540
Delgado C, Rosegrant M, Steinfeld H, Ehui
S and Courbois C 1999 . Livestock to 2020; The Next Food Revolution. Food,
Agriculture and the Environment Discussion Paper 28.International
Food Policy Research Institute. Washington DC
Fleay B J 1995 Decline of the age of oil. Pluto Press.
Annandale. NSW Australia
FO Lights 2002
World Bio Fuels 2002. International Molasses
and Alcohol Report May 16th 39, 9 p157
Funes F, Garcia L, Bourke M, Perez N and Rosset P 2004
Sustainable Agriculture and Resistance Transforms Food Production
in Cuba. Publishers, Food First Books and ACTAF ISBN 0-935028-87-0
Hubbert M K 1949
Energy from Fossil fuels. Science see
www.oilcrisis.com/summary.htm
Hubbert M K 1956 Nuclear Energy and Fossil Fuels, Proceedings
API Drilling and Production Practices,7-25
Ismail I 1993 A future growth of OPEC oil production capacity
and the impact of environmental measures. 6th Meeting of
the International Energy Workshop. Vienna Austria June
1993
Ivanhoe L F 1997 King Hubbert -Updated, Hubbert Center
Newsletter 97/1
Ivanhoe L F 1998 Petroleum Position of The United States. Hubbert Center Newsletter 98/1
Johnson H R, Crawford P M and Bunger J W 2004
Strategic
Significance of America's Oil Shale Resource Volume 1 Assessment of
Strategic Issues 2004 Report prepared for Office of Naval
Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves. US Department of Energy.
Washington DC.
http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/reserves/publications/Pubs-NPR/npr_strategic_significancev1.pdf
Leng R A 1990
Factors effecting the utilisation of poor
quality forages by ruminants particularly under tropical
conditions. Nutrition Research Reviews 3, 277.
Leng R A 2002 Future directions of animal production in a
fossil fuel hungry world. Livestock Research for Rural Development
(14) 5: http://www.cipav.org.co/lrrd/lrrd/14/5leng145.htm
Leng R A 2004 Requirements for protein meals for ruminant
meat production. In, Protein sources for the animal feed industry.
Expert consultation and workshop. Bangkok. May, 2002. FAO, Rome. pp
225-254.
Magoon L 2001
Oil Production Curve, Cause for Concern.
Australian Energy News 2001 page 30
McKillop A 2004a Oil price trends through 2004-2010. PETROLEUM World.com. http://www.petroleum world.com/SunOPF112104
McKillop A 2004b
There is no supply side answers to the coming
oil crisis. http://vheadline.com/printer_news,asp?id=23929
National Geographic June 2004 The end of oil pages
Oswald A and Oswald J 2005 Warwick University, UK. www.iom3.org/materialsworld
Pearse Lyons T and Bannerman J 2001 The US Fuel Ethanol
Industry from 1980 to 2001: Lessons for Other Markets . In " A Time
for Answers". Proceedings of Alltech's 15th Asia
-Pacific Lecture Tour. 115.
Pimentel D 2001 Biomass Utilization, Limits of. In
Encyclopedia of Physical Science and Technology. Third Edition Vol
2 pages 159.
Pimentel D, Warneke A F, Teel W S, Schab K A, Simcox N J, Ebert
D M, Baenisch K D, and Aaron M R 1988 Food versus biomass
fuel; Socio-economic and environmental impacts in the United
States, Brazil, India, and Kenya. Advances in Food Research 32
185-238
Pretty J N 1995 Regenerating Agriculture: Politics and Practice for Sustainability and Self Reliance.Earthscan
Preston T R and Leng R A 2004: Global decline in oil and natural resources; implications for the scope and content of papers for publication in LRRD. Livestock Research for Rural Development. Vol. 16, Art. #87. Retrieved July 24, 105, from http://www.cipav.org.co/lrrd/lrrd16/11/pres16087.htm
Rameker J 2004 Grain production, supply and demand outlook and trends in livestock feed industry. Proceedings 11th Animal Science Congress, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, September 5-8, 2004
Ruppert M C 2004
Peak Oil and the big picture. Speech to the
Commonwealth Club, San Francisco August 2004. http://www.yubanet.com/artman/publish/printer_15732.shtml
Ruppert M C 2005 The beginning of the oil end game featuring
original FTW maps www.fromthewilderness.com.
Roberts P 2004
End of oil. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 38 Soho
Square, London W1D 3HB
Schempf F J 2004 Simmons hopes he's wrong. http://www.petroleumnews.com/pnarchpop/040801-02.html
Simmons M R 2002 The World's Giant Oil Fields; how many exist? how much do they produce/ how fast are they declining ? Hubbert Center Newsletter 2002/1-1-1
Shapouri H, Duffield J A and Graboski M S 1995 Estimating the
net energy balance of corn ethanol. US Department of Agriculture
.Agricultural Economic Report Number 721 http://www.ethanol-gec.org/corn_eth.htm
United Nations Millennium Indicators Database
2004 http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_goals.asp
Youngquist W 1997
Geodestinies. National Book Company,
Portland, Oregon http://egi.lib.vidaho.edu.egj09/youngqu1.htm.